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I. Background
Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and the subsequent
revelations concerning the al Qaeda network's extensive money laundering network, anti-
money laundering authorities have focused their attention on detecting and deterring
money laundering systems used to finance international terrorism. Anti-money laundering
authorities in the United States and abroad have also worked to develop sufficient legal
bases to prosecute those who provide the financial fuel for terrorist groups. September 1 Ith
tragically illustrated the significant challenges law enforcement authorities face-not only
do more mundane criminals employ the mechanisms of the modem transnational finance
system, but so do terrorists and their financiers. The financiers of international terrorism
use offshore banks, Internet shell banks, correspondent and private banking, as well as less
formal, often ancient mechanisms like bawala, the black market peso exchange, bulk cash
smuggling, and illegal money remitting businesses, to transfer money from place to place,
as well as to conceal the path, source, and ownership of the laundered funds.
In the United States, lawmakers have responded to the challenges of combating both the
formal and informal financial systems used by money launderers by amending existing
statutes and enacting new anti-money laundering laws and regulations. On October 26,
2001, as part of a larger package of reforms, Congress passed the International Money
Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001.' The new legislation
amends existing federal law by, among other things, requiring greater due diligence by
banks in forming relationships and conducting transactions with customers and other banks,
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expanding the list of entities required to file currency transaction reports, broadening fed-
eral authority to obtain foreign bank records, granting federal authorities the power to seize
the assets of terrorists and the proceeds of terrorist activities, and otherwise expanding
federal laws prohibiting money laundering and forfeiting its proceeds.'
The 2001 amendments are relatively sweeping, however, as with all legislative enact-
ments, it is likely that, in practice, deficiencies in the amended money laundering and
forfeiture laws will be discovered and addressed in later legislation. Whether the 2001
amendments are sufficient to address the threat posed to the international financial system,
and the safety and security of the United States and other nations, remains to be seen.
Despite the scope of these latest amendments, law enforcement authorities may discover
that they still lack the necessary resources to address informal methods of transferring and/
or laundering funds. Such resources might include: expanded statutory and regulatory au-
thority, improved intelligence gathering and analysis capabilities, or enhanced mechanisms
for obtaining cooperation in particular areas from foreign authorities.
Moreover, in some areas the amendments may impose additional obligations that frus-
trate Congress's objectives. For example, the burdens expanded currency reporting require-
ments impose on both the reporting entities and the receiving agencies may outweigh any
expected benefits. Thus, the 2001 amendments to U.S. anti-money laundering law may go
too far, and yet not far enough.
Almost certainly Congress and the legislatures of other nations allied in the fight against
terrorism will attempt to further strengthen the laws governing informal money transfer
systems; al Qaeda, and presumably other terror groups, have reportedly funded their activ-
ities through virtually untraceable hawala money transfers, as well as through the use of
more sophisticated mechanisms.' While informal, private means of transferring funds may
be difficult to detect and prevent, the implementation of a broad array of approaches may
help to shut off the flow of funds to terrorists and other criminals through both formal and
informal mechanisms. Future anti-money laundering initiatives may include: (1) educating
immigrant communities in developed nations about their access to the banking system;
(2) publicizing the restrictions on the illicit transfer of funds and the reporting requirements
for currency and monetary instruments; (3) implementing legitimate money transfer sys-
tems that would facilitate expatriates' transfers of funds to their home countries; (4) im-
posing strict penalties on those who provide unlicensed banking, lending or check cashing
services, who fail to file required currency and other reports, or who fail to declare income
from their money transfer or lending services; and (5) using the resources of governments,
multilateral organizations and international financial institutions to research and develop
methodologies to deter the use of informal money transfer systems, and to replace these
mechanisms with legitimate banking opportunities.
In addition to the changes made to U.S. law, multilateral anti-money laundering orga-
nizations have quickly moved to address the issues raised by the events of September 11,
2001. Significantly, although terrorism had been an area of concern previously, the Financial
Action Task Force (FATF) has turned its attention more directly to encouraging Member
States to take specific action against money laundering used to finance or aid international
terrorism. To that end, the FATF issued eight Special Recommendations on Terrorist Fi-
2. Id.
3. See Frantz, infra note 36.
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nancing that are designed to respond to the growing concerns over the means used to
finance the spread of terrorism.
Finally, unrelated to the recent terrorist threat, the European Union (EU), the United
Kingdom, Canada, and certain Caribbean nations, have taken action to strengthen national
anti-money laundering regimes and enforcement efforts. Of particular note are the so-called
"gatekeeper initiatives," intended to combat international money laundering by enlisting
the assistance of financial and legal professionals involved in cross-border business trans-
actions. The gatekeeper initiatives, as currently manifested in those jurisdictions, require
lawyers (as well as other financial service professionals) to maintain information concerning
their clients, and report their clients' suspicious activities to national authorities, under
certain circumstances. The effects of these directives on U.S. lawyers practicing or doing
business in EU or Commonwealth nations will bear watching, because these gatekeeper
initiatives may conflict with U.S. lawyers' ethical obligations of confidentiality regarding
privileged communications.
II. Developments in U.S. Anti-Money Laundering Law and Strategy
A. AMENDMENTS TO U.S. ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING LAws
Prior to the September 11 th attacks, the U.S. Congress had been considering various
amendments to the federal money laundering laws. After the attacks Congress quickly
moved to implement a range of aggressive anti-money laundering initiatives by modifying
existing law. Specifically, Congress enacted the Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA
PATRIOT Act) 4 to combat terrorism, by, among other things, enhancing existing money
laundering and forfeiture laws.
In enacting Tide III of the USA PATRIOT Act, known as the International Money
Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001 (2001 Money Laundering
Act), Congress recognized the need to develop additional strategies for combating domestic
and international money laundering, and expanding the ability of law enforcement author-
ities to forfeit the proceeds and instrumentalities of criminal activity. In its findings, Con-
gress noted that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has estimated that money laun-
dering amounts to approximately two percent to five percent of global gross domestic
product annually, or about $600 billion each year, which "provides the financial fuel that
permits transnational criminal enterprises to conduct and expand their operations to the
detriment of the safety and security of American citizens."5 Moreover, Congress stated that
"money laundering, and the defects in financial transparency on which money launderers
rely, are critical to financing global terrorism and providing funds for terrorist attacks." 6
Congress was particularly concerned that foreign jurisdictions with weak supervisory and
enforcement regimes, which permit the use of anonymous offshore banking facilities, make
possible the illicit movement of funds that are either the proceeds of, or used to commit,
offenses including narcotics trafficking, terrorism, arms smuggling, trafficking in human
4. Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
5. Id. § 302(a)(1).
6. Id. § 302(a)(2).
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beings, and financial fraud.' Congress also expressed concern over the potential misuse of
private and correspondent banking services to facilitate these offenses.,
In response to these concerns, Congress expanded the reach of U.S. anti-money laun-
dering laws. The 2001 Money Laundering Act enhances existing U.S. anti-money laun-
dering and forfeiture laws, by concentrating on three areas. First, the Act enacted substan-
tive changes to the criminal laws, including by expanding the list of "specified unlawful
activities" (SUA). For example, the Act enlarged the list of crimes that may serve as predicate
offenses for money laundering crimes, and expanded the government's powers to seize and
forfeit tainted funds and property, including the property of terrorists, terrorist organiza-
tions and the proceeds of terrorist acts. Second, the Act focused attention on U.S. financial
institutions. For instance, financial institutions are required to take "special measures" when
dealing with foreign institutions and jurisdictions found to be of "primary money laundering
concern," and otherwise to regulate more strictly the relationships between U.S. financial
institutions and foreign banks and persons.9 Third, the Act grants additional procedural
tools to federal courts, law enforcement, and regulatory authorities. In all, the 2001 Money
Laundering Act substantially amends U.S. law.
B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TO FEDERAL LAW
1. Substantive Amendments to U.S. Anti-Money Laundering Laws - Expanded SUAs
and Forfeiture Authority
As with prior amendments to federal law, the 2001 Money Laundering Act has enlarged
the catalog of SUAs that may give rise to money laundering offenses. The Act expands the
list of money laundering predicate offenses to include: additional Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) predicate offenses; ° foreign crimes, including all crimes
of violence, foreign public corruption, and offenses for which the United States would be
required to extradite or prosecute the offender;" operation of an illegal money remission
business, either with the knowledge that the funds being transmitted were derived from a
criminal offense or that they were intended to be used for an unlawful purpose; 2 and bulk
cash smuggling of amounts greater than $10,000 into or out of the United States. 3
The 2001 Money Laundering Act also expands the federal government's forfeiture au-
thority. In a new provision, enacted as part of Title 18, Section 981, Congress provided for
the civil forfeiture of the assets of any person, entity or organization engaged in terrorism.
In addition, Congress authorized the forfeiture of any property "affording any person a
source of influence over such entity or organization" where the assets or property were
"acquired or maintained by any person with the intent and for the purpose of supporting,
planning, conducting, or concealing" an act of domestic or international terrorism against
U.S. persons or property, or which were "derived from, involved in, or used or intended
7. Id. § 302(a)(4).
8. Id. §§ 302(a)(6), (7).
9. See John Gibault, Show Them the Money: The Anti-Terrorism Laws Target Money Laundering, Forcing Banks
to be More Vigilant and Compliance Officers to Take on More Tasks, ABAJournal, Jan. 2002, at 47-48.
10. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B) (West 2001).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(B) (West 2001).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1960 (West 2001).
13. 31 U.S.C. § 5332 (West 2001).
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to be used" to commit such acts.' 4 The property of a person convicted of an international
terrorism offense may also be forfeited criminally pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c). Addi-
tionally, the amendments permit the government to seek forfeiture of proceeds or instru-
mentalities, or in some instances, property used to facilitate the predicate money laundering
offenses. These include domestic or international terrorism directed at U.S. persons and
property,"5 the expanded list of racketeering predicates,6 foreign crimes," currency re-
porting offenses and conspiracy to commit reporting offenses,18 and bulk cash smuggling.19
2. Stricter Regulation of U.S. Financial Institutions' Relationships with Foreign Banks
and Persons
Money laundering through financial institutions is of special concern to Congress. The
2001 amendments increase the civil and criminal penalties for money laundering that may
be imposed on financial institutions-up to twice the amount of the transaction or up to
one million dollars.2 ° The Secretary of the Treasury may require U.S. financial institutions
to take certain "special measures" with respect to foreign institutions or jurisdictions where
reasonable grounds exist to believe that they are of "primary money laundering concern." 2'
The 2001 Money Laundering Act further requires banks to conduct enhanced due dili-
gence for private banking and correspondent accounts,22 and prohibits U.S. banks from
maintaining correspondent accounts with foreign "shell banks."23 In addition, the Act
enhances the operational capabilities of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
(FinCEN).24 The Treasury Department has issued interim guidelines and proposed reg-
ulations implementing the provisions dealing with correspondent banking and reporting
by broker/dealers.2"
3. Expanded Procedural Authority
Finally, the Act provides the government with certain additional law enforcement tools.
The Attorney General or the Secretary of the Treasury may issue a summons or subpoena
to obtain foreign bank records, even those maintained overseas, by serving the financial
institution's designated representative in the United States.2 6 The government may also
seek to forfeit funds deposited in a foreign bank by filing a civil action against the equivalent
amount deposited in a corresponding U.S. bank account. The government is not required
to trace the funds, nor does the foreign bank have standing to challenge the forfeiture action
14. 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(G) (West 2001).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(G) (West 2001).
16. 31 U.S.C. § 5332(c) (West 2001).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(B) (West 2001).
18. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5317(c), 5324, 5331 (West 2001).
19. 31 U.S.C. § 5332 (West 2001).
20. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 5321, 5322 (West 2001).
21. 31 U.S.C. § 5318A (West 2001).
22. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(i) (West 2001).
23. Shell banks are a phenomenon of the Internet age; they are banks that have no physical presence any-
where, and are not subject to regulation by any country. See 31 U.S.C. § 5318(j) (West 2001).
24. See USA PATRIOT Act, §§ 310, 362, 115 Stat. 332.
25. A link to the proposed guidelines and the interim rules is available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/
po887.htm. The proposed rule concerning financial institutions is reprinted at 31 C.F.R. pt. 104 (2001). The
proposed rule concerning reporting requirements for broker/dealers is reprinted at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103 (2001).
26. See 31 U.S.C. § 5318(k) (West 2001).
27. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(k) (West 2001).
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by asserting an "innocent owner" defense.27 Further, the "fugitive disentitlement doctrine"
has been expanded to prohibit corporations from recovering forfeited funds where a ma-
jority shareholder, or any other person filing a claim on the company's behalf, is personally
disqualified from recovering such funds."
Congress also expanded the money laundering venue provisions. Following the Supreme
Court's suggestion 9 that money laundering may be a continuing offense where the SUA
took place in one judicial district, but the financial transaction occurred in another, Con-
gress amended Title 18 to permit prosecutors to bring cases in any district where the
defendant participated in moving the funds.30
The judiciary has also been granted expanded powers. Federal courts may exercise long
arm personal jurisdiction over foreign nationals who violate 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a).Jurisdic-
tion may be found where the financial transaction occurred in whole or in part within the
United States, where a U.S. court had issued an order of forfeiture and the foreign person
converted the funds to his or her own use, or where the foreign person is a financial insti-
tution that maintains a bank account in the United States.31 Courts are now explicitly per-
mitted to order a criminal defendant to repatriate forfeitable assets to the United States,"
and they may enforce foreign forfeiture orders either before trial or post-conviction.33 Ad-
ditionally, a court may also appoint a receiver to take control of the defendant's assets in
order to satisfy a judgment, including an order of restitution to a victim of an SUA1 4
B. POTENTIAL GAPs IN U.S. ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING LAw
Although wide-ranging, the changes to U.S. law may not go far enough. In particular,
the 2001 Money Laundering Act may not fully address informal financial transactions.
Since September 11 th the role of informal transactions in fimding terrorism has received
significant attention. 36 Because the hawala37 system in use through much of the Middle East,
Asia (in China, it is known as "fei qian" or flying money), and elsewhere may have been
used to finance operations of al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, it is likely that, to the
28. 28 U.S.C. § 2466 (West 2001).
29. See United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1, 8 (1998) ("money laundering.., arguably might rank as a
'continuing offense,' triable in more than one place, if the launderer acquired the funds in one district and
transported them into another.").
30. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(i) (West 2001).
31. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(b)(2) (West 2001).
32. 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(4) (West 2001).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 2467 (West 2001). By enacting this provision, Congress appears to be signaling that it hopes
that foreign jurisdictions will do likewise, and enforce U.S. forfeiture orders.
34. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(b)(4) (West 2001).
35. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1960 (West 2001) (illicit transmission of funds).
36. See, e.g., Douglas Frantz, A Nation Challenged: Ancient Secret System Moves Money Globally, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 3, 2001, at B5; Meenakshi Ganguly, A Banking System Builtfor Terrorism, TIME, Oct. 5, 2001, available at
http://www.time.com; Michelle Cottle, Hawala v. The War on Terrorism, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Oct. 15, 2001,
available at http://www.thenewrepublic.com/101501/cottle101510.html; Kurt Eichenwald, A Nation Challenged:
Terror Money Hard to Block, N.Y. TiES, Dec. 10, 2001, at Al.
37. As in a letter of credit transaction, in a bawala transaction, the funds that are being transferred do not
physically move. Instead, for a fee, the sender contracts, often orally, with an intermediary who advises a
counterpart located near the recipient to pay the recipient a sum of money. Because these transactions may
involve multiple intermediaries, tend to occur between people who have developed familial or other bonds of
trust, and the parties may avoid written communications-perhaps to escape local authorities in states where
bawala is illegal-they may be very difficult to control.
VOL. 36, NO. 2
THE IMPACT OF SEPTEMBER 11TH 739
extent that such informal systems are susceptible to regulation, the United States will further
amend its law to regulate and control these mechanisms, much as it has done with check
cashing and money-wiring institutions. Moreover, it is likely that the United States will
encourage jurisdictions that regularly permit such transactions, whether officially or oth-
erwise, to take additional steps to control these informal money transfer systems."8 In ad-
dition, the 2001 Money Laundering Act may not fully address emerging money laundering
typologies including Internet and electronic banking, or jurisdictional issues relating to the
cross-border investigation and prosecution of money laundering offenses. The U.S. gov-
ernment will need to continue monitoring the development of new money laundering tech-
niques and issues, and develop appropriate legislative responses.
C. THE 2001 U.S. NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY
Even before the events of September 11 th, the U.S. government had planned to address
perceived gaps in U.S. anti-money laundering enforcement. In September 2001, the At-
torney General and the Secretary of the Treasury issued the 2001 U.S. National Money
Laundering Strategy (2001 Strategy). 9 Because the 2001 Strategy was prepared in substan-
tial part before the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, and before the USA PATRIOT
Act was adopted, it focused less on combating terrorism and more on traditional law en-
forcement and regulatory concerns. However, many of the issues raised by the government
have made their way into the 2001 Money Laundering Act.
The strategy contains five goals, each of which is sub-divided into one or more objectives,
which are further subdivided into priorities. For example, as its first goal the United States
intends to focus its law enforcement efforts on the prosecution of major money laundering
organizations and systems. The objectives identified in connection with achieving that goal
include: developing, organizing, and coordinating "High Intensity Money Laundering and
Related Financial Crime Area (I-FCA) Task Forces;" enhancing the use of federal criminal
and civil asset forfeiture laws through the HIFCAs and other mechanisms, enhancing intra-
and inter-agency coordination of money laundering investigations; expanding efforts to
dismantle the black market peso exchange;- and enacting legislation to address deficiencies
in current U.S. law. The 2001 Money Laundering Act implements many of these legislative
goals; the others presumably will be addressed through inter- and intra-agency coordination
of law enforcement efforts.
The second goal requires the government to develop methods of measuring the effec-
tiveness of anti-money laundering efforts, with the objective of developing and imple-
menting systems to institutionalize such measurement methodologies. The third goal is to
prevent money laundering through public-private efforts and regulatory measures. The
objectives supporting this goal include examining the efficacy of existing reporting require-
38. The FATF has reported that the bawala system remains favored in much of the world because it is
reliable, convenient, cheaper than moving funds through the banking system, and almost untraceable. See
FATF, REPORT OF MONEY LAUNDERING TYPOLOGIES 1999-2000, FATF-XI, at 6, T 24, Feb. 3, 2000, available
at http://www.oecd.org/fatf/pdffTY2000_en.pdf (last visitedJan. 2, 2002) [hereinafter FATF XI].
39. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY & U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, THE 2001 NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING STRAT-
EGY, available at www.ustreas.gov (last visited Nov. 15, 2001) [hereinafter 2001 Strategy].
40. The black market peso exchange (BMPE) is another informal money laundering method, similar to the
bawala system. See 2001 Strategy, supra note 39, at 13; FATF XI, supra note 38, at 5 (discussing the BMPE
and noting its use both by expatriate workers and narcotics traffickers).
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ments, expanding the types of financial institutions subject to the Bank Secrecy Act's re-
quirements, increasing the usefulness of information already reported to law enforcement
agencies and the financial industry, and minimizing the threat of money laundering by
foreign correspondent banks to U.S. financial institutions. The 2001 Money Laundering
Act substantially addresses the law enforcement aspects of this goal, particularly through
the provisions granting expanded powers to the Justice and Treasury Departments in ob-
taining access to foreign bank records, expanded the list of entities subject to currency
reporting requirements, and adding restrictions placed on private banking and offshore
shell banks. 4' The objective of re-focusing the reporting requirements-making them both
less burdensome for reporting entities and more useful for law enforcement-has been
given additional prominence by the revelations concerning al Qaeda's funding of the Sep-
tember 1 lth terrorists, and will require additional analysis and review.
The fourth goal concerns the coordination of federal, state and local law enforcement
efforts. The 2001 Strategy's objectives in this area include: providing seed capital for state
and local anti-money laundering efforts; improving inter-agency coordination; and enhancing
the effectiveness of state and local agency's access to and use of Bank Secrecy Act data. The
government's fifth goal is strengthening international anti-money laundering cooperation. Its
objectives include: enhancing cooperation and effectiveness between law enforcement agen-
cies; continuing the United States' role in FATF and similar organizations; providing tech-
nical assistance to foreign jurisdictions working to combat money laundering; cooperating
with the international financial institutions to enhance anti-money laundering efforts; and
taking necessary coordinated action against money laundering threats.
As discussed above, many of the 2001 Strategy's goals and objectives-at least those that
can be met through legislative action-have found their way into the 2001 Money Laun-
dering Act. The Act's measures addressing money laundering through foreign banks,4 its
expansion of the types of enterprises subject to currency reporting requirements, 4 and its
grant to the judiciary of explicit authority over enforcing foreign forfeiture orders,- are
consistent with and implement a number of the 2001 Strategy's goals. Whether the re-
maining goals are implemented, or whether the strategy is substantially re-focused towards
addressing the funding of international terrorism, remains to be seen.
III. The Financial Action Task Force's Response to the September 11 th
Terrorist Attacks, and Its Ongoing Anti-Money Laundering Activities
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 4 responded quickly to the September 11 th
terrorist attacks by developing an initiative aimed at preventing the laundering of funds
41. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 5318(k) (West 2001) (foreign banks required to appoint agent for service of process
in the U.S.); 31 U.S.C. § 533 1(c) (West 2001) (currency reporting requirements); 31 U.S.C. § 5318(i) (West
2001) (enhanced due diligence for private and correspondent banking accounts); 31 U.S.C. § 5318(j) (West
2001) (U.S. banks prohibited from maintaining correspondent accounts with foreign shell banks).
42. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 981(k) (West 2001) (forfeiture of property in interbank accounts); 31 U.S.C. § 5318
(West 2001) (subpoenas and summons on foreign banks).
43. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 5331, 5332 (West 2001).
44. See 28 U.S.C. § 2467 (West 2001).
45. The FATF is an independent international body, whose Secretariat is housed at the OECD. It was
formed by the G-7 Economic Summit Group inJuly 1989 to "examine measures to combat money laundering."
In 1990, FATF issued its "Forty Recommendations" on combating money laundering. See FATF, ANNUAL
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used to finance terrorism. 46 On October 30, 2001, at an emergency meeting, FATF Presi-
dent Clarie Lo announced that "[o]ur mission is to strangle and cut the supply of money
and assets that is the lifeblood of terrorists. ' 47 Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill likewise said:
"FATF is uniquely positioned to take up the challenges of terrorist financing. Our goal
must be nothing less than the disruption and elimination of the financial frameworks that
support terrorism and its abhorrent acts. '48 Secretary O'Neill further recommended that
"the FATF adopt special recommendations that will set the international standard for com-
bating terrorist financing, that all countries swiftly comply with these standards, and that
there be regular public reports on the state of play in identifying and take action against
terrorist financing."49
Thereafter, on October 31, 2001, the FATF announced that it was expanding its mission
beyond traditional money laundering to focus its energy and expertise on the worldwide
effort to combat terrorist financing. To that end, FATF issued eight Special Recommendations
on Terrorist Financing. 0 The Special Recommendations"' require Member States to:
* Take immediate steps to ratify and implement the relevant United Nations instruments.
* Criminalize the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts and terrorist organizations.
* Freeze and confiscate terrorist assets.
* Report suspicious transactions linked to terrorism.
* Provide the widest possible range of assistance to other countries' law enforcement and
regulatory authorities for terrorist financing investigations.
* Impose anti-money laundering requirements on alternative remittance systems.
* Strengthen customer identification measures in international and domestic wire transfers.
* Ensure that entities, in particular non-profit organizations, cannot be misused to finance
terrorism.
FATF members further agreed to a comprehensive Plan of Action, with a six-month
timetable starting in December 2001, that requires them to conduct self-assessments con-
cerning their implementation of the Special Recommendations; develop additional guid-
ance for financial institutions and educate them regarding mechanisms by which terrorists
finance their activities; identify non-compliant jurisdictions and take steps to bring them
into compliance by implementing possible, undefined "counter-measures;" publish reports
REPORT, FATF XII, at 3, June 22, 2001, available at http://wwwl.oecd.org/fatf/FATDocsen.htm#Annual
(last visited Nov. 18, 2001) [hereinafter FATF XII].
The thirty member countries and governments of the FATF are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, China, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States. Two international organizations
are also members of the FATF-the European Commission and the Gulf Co-operation Council. See FATF
XII, supra, at 3. More information on the FATF can be found on its Web site at http://www.fatf-gafi.org.
46. The FATF publishes a report annually discussing its Member States' progress over the prior year in
combating money laundering. FATF issued its annual 2000-2001 report on June 22, 2001. See FATF XII,
upra note 45.
47. See http://www.oecd.org/oecd/pages/home/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2001).
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. The full text of the FATF Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing is available at http://
www.oecd.org/oecd/pages/home/.
51. See FATF, SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS, available at http://www.oecd.org/oecd/pages/home/ (lastvisited
Dec. 28, 2001).
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concerning the amount of terrorists' funds that have been frozen, and provide technical
assistance to non-Member States to assist them in complying with the Special Recommen-
dations."a The FATF further resolved to coordinate its actions with other organizations and
bodies, including the United Nations, the Egmont Group,53 the G-20, and the International
Financial Institutions. FATF also agreed to take into account the Special Recommendations
as its members revise the FATF's Forty Recommendations on Money Laundering14 and to
"intensify its work with respect to corporate vehicles, correspondent banking, identification
of beneficial owners of accounts, and regulation of non-bank financial institutions.""
Prior to the events of September 11 th and continuing in tandem with its anti-terrorism
objectives, during 2000-2001 the FATF's activities had focused on three main areas: spread-
ing the anti-money laundering message, improving its members' implementation of the
Forty Recommendations, and strengthening the review of money laundering methods and
counter-measures.56 The FATF published an update to its list of non-cooperative countries
and territories (NCCT), worked to develop and enhance the functioning of additional
FATF-style regional bodies,"1 enhanced its cooperation with the International Financial
Institutions, and launched a review of the Forty Recommendations.', The FATF considers
its work in reviewing, and publishing its list of NCCTs to be of great significance; the
counterpart to the FATF's model of self-analysis by Member States and peer evaluation
and review is the public disclosure of those countries that are non-compliant with the
FATF's anti-money laundering objectives.59
Also in 2000-2001, the FATF continued its typologies exercise, identifying those methods
of laundering money that are of growing and continuing concern. The FATF reiterated
concerns over the anonymity afforded to money launderers by the Internet, the use of trusts
and other corporate entities for complex and large-scale money laundering schemes, de-
veloping a gatekeeper initiative similar to that established by the EU that would require
52. See id.
53. The "Egmont Group" (named for the location of the first meeting in the Egmont-Arenberg Palace in
Brussels), launched in approximately 1995, is an informal organization of government agencies specializing in
anti-money laundering functions. Forty countries have created anti-money laundering units under the Egmont
Group's auspices, known as "financial intelligence units" or FlUs, to address the problem of money laundering.
The Egmont Group's goal "is to provide a forum for FIUs to improve support to their respective national
anti-money laundering programmes. This support includes expanding and systematizing the exchange of fi-
nancial intelligence, improving expertise and capabilities of the personnel of such organizations, and fostering
better communication among FlUs through the application of new technologies." See The Egmont Group of
Financial Intelligence Units, available at http://wwwl.oecd.org/fatf/Ctry-orgpages/org-egmonten.htm (last
visited Nov. 18, 2001).
54. The Forty Recommendations are available at http://www.oecd.org/fatf.
55. Id.
56. See FATF XII, spra note 45, at 1.
57. These include the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), the oldest regional body, founded
in 1990-92, with twenty-five current Member States; the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG),
established in 1997, and having twenty-two Member States at present; the Council of Europe's Select Com-
mittee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (PC-R-Ev), established in 1997, by
the Committee of Ministers; the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG),
a fourteen-member body founded in 1999; and the Grripo de Accidn Financiera de Sudamrtica Contra el lavado de
Activos (GAFISUD), a group of nine South American countries founded in 2000. See FATF XII, supra note 45,
at 5-7.
58. See id. at 1, 3.
59. See id. at 10-11.
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lawyers and notaries to report suspicious client transactions, the cross-border movement of
large quantities of cash and the laundering of cash in certain luxury industries (citing the
cash purchase of thoroughbred race horses as one example), and the laundering of funds
by and for terrorists. 60 The FATF noted that anti-money laundering regimes differ with
respect to whether countries are able to restrain otherwise clean funds that might be used
to fund terrorism (essentially, what would be called under U.S. law "promotion" money
laundering).6 ' In the United States, this issue has recently arisen in the context of the
government's crackdown on the promotion of terrorism through donations to charitable
organizations. While charitably minded persons who make donations to organizations that
they understand to be engaged in legitimate activities should not be prosecuted, those
organizations raising funds, under whatever pretext, in order to finance terrorism, may be
prosecuted and their assets seized.62 The FATF may encourage other Member States to
develop similar laws.
IV. Gatekeeper Initiatives: European Union and Commonwealth Countries
A. EUROPEAN UNION
On October 31, 2001 the European Parliament amended "Council Directive 91/308/
EEC on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laun-
dering."63 The EU Directive is noteworthy for its "gatekeeper" requirement, by which
lawyers and notaries (who perform quasi-legal functions in many civil law jurisdictions)
will be required to supply information concerning suspicious transactions to national
authorities (including, perhaps, specially constituted bar association units).64 Lawyers and
notaries will be "subject to the provisions of the EU Directive when participating in
financial or corporate transactions, including providing tax advice, where there is the
greatest risk of the services of those legal professionals being misused for the purpose of
laundering the proceeds of criminal activity" and thus required to report their clients'
suspicious activities, with certain exceptions." The EU Directive aims at preventing clients
from using the services of lawyers and notaries to launder the proceeds of criminal activities,
or otherwise concealing or disguising the source of funds or other property, in connection
with criminal activity.66
Lawyers and notaries are not required to report suspicious activity where they are ascer-
taining a client's legal position or in connection with judicial proceedings.61 "Thus, legal
advice remains subject to the obligation of professional secrecy unless the legal counselor
is taking part in money laundering activities, the legal advice is provided for money laun-
dering purposes, or the lawyer knows the client is seeking legal advice for money laundering
purposes." 68 By contrast, the United States has no such reporting requirements. Instead, in
60. Seeid. at 15-17.
61. See id. at 16, 82.
62. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(G) (West 2001).
63. See European Parliament Directive PE-CONS 3654/01, 10/31/01, amending Council Directive91/308/
EEC [hereinafter EU Directive].
64. See, e.g., id. art. 6(3); Preamble, para. 16.
65. Id.
66. See id. art. I(C), (D).
67. See id. art. 6(3).
68. Id. at Preamble, para. 17.
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some circumstances, the government may forfeit legal fees paid to defense counsel, where
they were derived from illicit activity.5 9 Attorneys practicing in the United States have no
privilege to violate the law; they are required to supply truthful information to banks in
connection with the filing of currency reports,70 and can be prosecuted for participating in
a money laundering scheme."l Moreover, attorneys are ethically prohibited from continuing
to represent a client where the attorney is aware that the client intends to break the law,
and communications made to an attorney for the purpose of furthering the client's criminal
activity are not privileged.72 With a few exceptions, however, state bar ethics rules prohibit
attorneys from disclosing confidential information obtained from their clients.7" Thus,
proposals to impose gatekeeper requirements on U.S. lawyers may run afoul of state bar
ethics rules.14
In addition to implementing the "gatekeeper" provisions, the amended EU Directive
expands the range of money laundering predicate offenses from narcotics offenses alone,
to include all "criminal activity," involving "the commission of a serious crime." The en-
larged list of predicate offenses includes those defined in Article 3(l)(a) of the Vienna Con-
vention, as well as "activities of criminal organizations," serious fraud, corruption, and any
offense that "may generate substantial proceeds and which is punishable by a severe sentence
of imprisonment.""
69. See, e.g., Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989) (The Sixth Amendment
does not prohibit government from forfeiting proceeds of criminal activity that might otherwise have been
used to pay defendant's legal fees); In re Moffitt, Zwerling & Kemler, P.C., 846 F. Supp. 463 (1994) (fee paid
to criminal defense attorneys forfeited because it was proceeds of client's drug trafficking).
70. See United States v. Belcher, 927 F.2d 1182 (11 th Cir. 1991) (holding that indictmentwas properwhere
attorney was alleged to have provided false information to bank, thereby causing it to file false CTR).
71. See United States v. Abbell, 271 F.3d 1286 (1 1th Cir. 2001) (affirming attorneys' money laundering
convictions).
72. See, e.g., CAL. EvIo. Coos § 956 (2001) ("There is no privilege under this article if the services of the
lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit a crime or fraud."); FED.
R. EvIo. 501 (2001) (importing state law privileges and exceptions into the federal rules).
73. The duty to protect client confidences is of paramount importance. For example, in People ex rel. Dept.
of Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Change Systems, Inc., 20 Cal.4th 1135 (1999), the California Supreme Court
stated: "Protecting the confidentiality of communications between attorney and client is fundamental to our
legal system... To this end, a basic obligation of every attorney is 'Itlo maintain inviolate the confidence, and
every peril to himself or herself to preserve the secrets, of his or her client."' (Citations omitted). The court
added, "A related but distinct fundamental value of our legal system is the attorney's obligation of loyalty.
Attorneys have a duty to maintain undivided loyalty to their clients to avoid undermining public confidence in
the legal profession and the judicial process." Id. at 1145 (citations omitted). Only in certain extreme circum-
stances may lawyers disclose otherwise privileged communications. See, e.g., CAL. Ewvo. CooE § 956.5 (2001)
("There is no privilege under this article if the lawyer reasonably believes that the disclosure of any confidential
client communication relating to representation of a client is necessary to prevent the client from committing
a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm.").
74. For example, the Sarbanes-Oxlcy Act of 2002 requires the Securities and Exchange Commission to issue
rules requiring attorneys practicing before the Commission to "report evidence of a material violation of
securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by [an issuer] or any agent thereof to the chief
legal counsel or the chief executive officer..." and if those individuals do not take effective action, to report
the alleged wrongdoing to the audit committee or another committee of the board comprised of outside
directors, or to the entire board. Id. § 307. Although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act does not require attorneys to
report information outside the company in the first instance, it makes no provision for the preservation of the
attorney-client privilege in connection with the required disclosures.
75. See Vienna Convention art. 1(E).
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The EU Directive is a guideline; Member States must develop implementing regula-
tions concerning such elements as "substantial proceeds" and "severe sentence of im-
prisonment."76 Member states will also need to address issues such as when a lawyer is
presumed to "know" the purpose for which a client is seeking legal advice or assistance
with a transaction. Lawyers who assist their clients with real estate transactions, acquiring
or disposing of property or assets of any kind, incorporating and operating companies, and
other business activities, will be subject to the EU Directive.77 Lawyers who handle what
in most circumstances are routine transactions may be unprepared to determine which
transactions and clients require additional scrutiny, and may lack the administrative and
other systems necessary to identify and report suspicious transactions. Thus, in cooperation
with EU Member States, the legal profession will need to develop educational programs
for attorneys practicing in those states, as well as for those who may on occasion become
involved in European transactions.
The EU Directive permits Member States that have professional associations regulat-
ing the activities of lawyers and notaries to designate a special body to receive suspicious
activity reports." Those entities will need to develop systems for obtaining and trans-
mitting suspicious activity reports to the relevant national authorities, as well as, perhaps,
an ethics hotline or other mechanism for assisting professionals in complying with their
obligations to their clients while also satisfying the EU Directive. Through such associa-
tions, lawyers and notaries may seek to develop national laws that would provide them with
immunity from either criminal or civil liability, where applicable, for disclosing otherwise
confidential information.
For U.S. lawyers and firms with cross-border practices representing European clients,
compliance with the EU Directive could violate U.S. rules governing the confidentiality of
attorney-client communications. Attorneys, bar associations, courts, and perhaps insurers,
will have to confront the potential conflicts between the EU Directive and the obligations
of confidentiality imposed on U.S. lawyers. 79 In the meantime, U.S. lawyers who represent
European clients proactively should take steps to comply with both U.S. and European law;
they may want to ask their clients to enter into written waiver agreements by which clients
agree to permit attorneys to disclose information concerning suspicious transactions to the
appropriate authorities, as required by any applicable law or regulation.
B. THE COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES - UNITED KINGDOM, CANADA, AND THE BAHAMAS
Certain of the Commonwealth countries, including the United Kingdom, Canada, and
the Bahamas have also enacted gatekeeper initiatives. Each statutory scheme is different,
but all impose reporting requirements on persons, including lawyers, who may have reason
to know or suspect that a client or other person may be engaged in money laundering. As
discussed below, the United Kingdom and Canada exempt privileged communications from
76. EU Directive, supra note 63.
77. See id. art. 2a(5).
78. See id. at Preamble, para. 20, and art. 6(3).
79. The USA PATRIOT Act amends 31 U.S.C. § 531 8 (g)(3) to provide civil immunity under both federal
and state law for financial institutions and their directors, officers and employees, who disclose suspected
violations of law or regulations. Similar legislation addressing the potential liability of lawyers and law firms
who are subject to the EU Directive ultimately may need to be implemented.
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the disclosure requirements, however, those exemptions are relatively narrowly drawn. The
Bahamian reporting system does not provide for any such exemptions.
1. The United Kingdom
For some time the United Kingdom has required persons and entities with knowledge
of money laundering activities to report information concerning those activities to the
appropriate law enforcement authorities. The failure to do so may be a criminal offense
under the Drug Trafficking Act (DTA) 1994; and the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary
Provision) Act (POTA) 1989, as amended by the Criminal Justice Act 1993.80 Each of these
statutes contains an exemption for privileged information. For example, section 52(2) of
the DTA provides, "Subsection (1) above [imposing the disclosure obligation] does not
make it an offence for a professional legal adviser to fail to disclose any information or
other matter which has come to him in privileged circumstances."8' Privileged circum-
stances are defined as follows:
(8) For purposes of this section, any information or other matter comes to a professional legal
adviser in privileged circumstances if it is communicated or given to him-
(a) By, or by a representative of, a client of his in connection with the giving by the adviser
of legal advice to the client; or
(b) By, or by a representative of, a person seeking legal advice from the adviser; or
(c) By any person-
(i) In contemplation of, or in connection with, legal proceedings; and
(ii) For the purpose of those proceedings."s
It is also an offense, under the DTA, the POTA, and the Criminal Justice Act (CJA)
1993 for any person to "tip off" the subject of a money laundering investigation about the
existence of that investigation, where the information is likely to prejudice the investiga-
tion.83 Again, these statutes each exempt "professional legal advisers" from the obligation
to disclose otherwise reportable information or other matters regarding money laundering
activity where that information is obtained in "privileged circumstances." 4
80. For example, Section 52(1) of the Drug Trafficking Act (DTA) provides that:
(1) A person is guilty of an offence if-
(a) he knows or suspects that another person is engaged in drug money laundering,
(b) the information, or other matter, on which that knowledge is based came to his attention in
the course of his trade, profession or business, and
(c) he does not disclose the information or other matters to a constable as soon as is reasonably
practical.
Drug Trafficking Act, 1994, c. 37, § 52(1) (Eng.) [hereinafter DTA. See also Prevention of Terrorism Act,
1989, c. 4, § 18A(1) (Eng.) [hereinafter POTA1.
81. See also POTA, supra note 80, § 18A(9).
82. DTA, supra note 80, § 52(8); see also POTA, supra note 80, § 17(2C).
83. See POTA, supra note 80, § 17, DTA, supra note 80, § 53, and CriminalJustice Act, 1993, c. 36, § 93D
(Eng.) [hereinafter CJAI. The restrictions imposed by these statutes are essentially identical. Section 17(2) of
the POTA provides that a person is liable if he or she either discloses to any other person information or "any
other matter" that might "prejudice" an investigation if the disclosing party knows that a terrorism investigation
is being, or is about to be conducted. Sections 17(2A) and 17(2B) prohibit the disclosure to any person of
information concerning prior disclosures about suspicious activities made to law enforcement authorities.
84. See DTA, supra note 80, §§ 52(2); POTA, supra note 80, §§ 17(2C); and CJA, supra note 83, § 93D(4).
For example, Section 17(2C) of the POTA states that:
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In addition, Supervisory Authorities, which are defined to include banking and financial
services organizations, are also required to provide law enforcement authorities with infor-
mation concerning actual or suspected money laundering activities." In particular, where
a supervisory authority "(a) obtains any information; and (b) is of the opinion that that
information indicates that any person has or may have been engaged in money laundering,
the authority shall, as soon as is reasonably practical, disclose that information to a consta-
ble.' ' s6 The Regulations also contain strict client-identification and record-keeping require-
ments. 7 Further, the Anti-Terrorism Act, Crime and Security, 2001, amends the Terrorism
Act 2000, making it is an offense for a person in the "regulated sector"8" to fail to disclose
promptly to a U.K. law enforcement officer that he "knows or suspects or has reasonable
grounds for knowing or suspecting that another person has committed an offence under
any of sections 15 to 18 (relating to funding terrorism and laundering terrorist funds), and
the information came to him in the course of a business in the regulated sector."8 9 A failure
to disclose such information is excused if the person "is a professional legal adviser and the
information or other matter came to him in privileged circumstances." 90
2. Canada
Canada's Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Suspicious Transaction Reporting
Regulations9' similarly impose reporting obligations on persons and entities involved in
financial transactions including accountants, money remitters, insurance agents, and real
estate brokers, among others.9 Legal counsel are subject to the reporting requirements
where they receive or pay funds (except funds relating to fees for professional services),
purchase or sell securities, or transfer funds or securities "by any means." 9 Persons subject
to the reporting requirements must supply certain statutorily required information94 to a
(2C) Nothing in subsections (2) to (2B) [relating to liability for "tipping off" any person] above makes
it an offence for a professional legal adviser to disclose any other matter-
(a) to, or to a representative of, a client of his in connection with the giving by the adviser of
legal advice to the client; or
(b) to any person-
(i) in contemplation of, or in connection with, legal proceedings; and
(ii) for the purpose of those proceedings.
Section 93 D(4) of the CJA similarly exempts the rendering of legal advice from the prohibitions on tipping
off any person about the existence or proposed existence of a money laundering investigation, or about any
disclosures regarding suspicious activities, where the information is likely to prejudice that investigation. See
CJA, supra note 83, § 93D(l)-(3). Section 53 of the DTA is virtually identical to the CJA and POTA sections
on "tipping off."
85. See Money Laundering Regulations 1993, S.I. No. 1993, § 15 (Eng.).
86. Id. § 16(1).
87. See id. §§ 7-13.
88. The regulated sector includes persons and entities: "(a) dealing in investments as principal or as agent;
(b) arranging deals in investments; (c) managing investments; (d) safeguarding and administering investments;
(e) sending dematerialised instructions; (f) establishing (and taking other steps in relation to) collective invest-
ment schemes; and (g) advising on investments." See Anti-Terrorism Act, Crime and Security, 2001, Schedule
3A, Part I(1) (Eng.).
89. See id. §§ 21A(l)-(4).
90. Id. § 21A(5)(b).
91. Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act, P.C. 2001-1500 (2001) (Can.)
92. See id. § 1, "Interpretation."
93. See id. § 5 (Application of Part 1 of the Act).
94. Section 12 provides that reports must contain information including the names, addresses, account
numbers and other identifying data concerning the transaction in question.
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governmental agency authorized to accept such reports "concerning a financial transaction
in respect of which there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the transaction is related
to the commission of a money laundering offence."95 Canada's Suspicious Transactions
Reporting Regulations exempt legal counsel from disclosing information covered by the
solicitor-client privilege. 91 Note, however, that the category of "privileged" communications
between a solicitor and her client may be substantially narrower than the range of otherwise
confidential, but unprivileged, client information known to legal counsel. Thus, under Ca-
nadian law, lawyers could be required to provide non-privileged, yet confidential infor-
mation concerning their clients' financial activities to governmental authorities. Because
the regulations are newly enacted and became effective only on November 8, 2001 their
impact on the relationship between legal counsel and their clients may take some time to
become known.
3. The Bahamas
The Bahamas has also enacted a gatekeeper initiative as part of its Financial and Cor-
porate Service Providers Act, 2000.91 The Act requires financial service providers to obtain
licenses and subjects them to regulation and inspection.9" The term "financial and corporate
services" encompasses services routinely provided by lawyers including "the registration or
management and administration of international business companies." 99 Among other
things, the appointed inspector is authorized to determine whether a potential licensee is
qualified to obtain a license based on criteria including "whether the applicant is a fit and
proper person" and the "professional reputation and experience of the applicant;"' ° conduct
periodic inspections of licensees;'' and provide information obtained during the course of
an inspection to foreign authorities.1°2 Before providing financial or corporate services to a
client licensees are required to verify the client's identity,'0 obtain identifying information
and two references from the client,- and maintain records concerning the client. 05 The
inspector may suspend or revoke the licenses of those found to have violated the statute.'
0 6
Licensees may also be subject to substantial fines if they are found to have violated the
Act.'07 Non-Bahamian lawyers who do business in the Bahamas will need to take these
regulations into account in structuring business and financial arrangements on behalf of
their clients.
95. Id. § 9(1).
96. See Part 1, § 5.
97. The statute, entitled "An Act to Provide for the Licensing and Regulation of Financial and Corporate
Service Providers and for Connected Purposes," was initially enacted on Dec. 29, 2000, and amended on Aug.
31, 2001. No. 41 of 2001 (Bah.)
98. See id. § 3.
99. Id. § 2.
100. Id. § 4.1(3).
101. Id. § 12.4.
102. Id. §§ 12A(3)-(7), (9).
103. Id. § 14(1).
104. Id. § 14(2).
105. Id. § 14(3), 15.
106. See id. §§ 16, 17.
107. See id. § 18.
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V. Conclusion
Since September 11, 2001 international attention has been intensely focused on the prac-
tice of laundering funds used to finance terrorism. Anti-money laundering authorities in
the United States and elsewhere have addressed some of these issues through enacting
legislation, promulgating implementing regulations, and drafting recommendations, along
with undertaking efforts to enhance and expand coordination. However, it is likely that
anti-money authorities will need to further focus their efforts on combating money laun-
dering conducted through informal methods outside the financial system, as well as through
emerging typologies such as Internet banking.
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